Main Findings and Contributions
 Differences in trade wage premium (or discount) across skill levels  evidence for within-group and betweengroup wage inequality.  Up to 30 percent of the overall skill premia associated with exporting.  These differences would tend to exacerbate effects of trade on inequality as trade expands.  But while the export activity contributes to conditional wage inequality along the dimension of skill, it reduces gender-based and nationality-based conditional wage inequality (wage discrimination).
 High correspondence between a worker's occupation and whether classified as Arbeiter or Angestellter.
• More than 90 percent of the workers in more than 200 of the 340 occupations are classified as either Arbeiter or Angestellter.
• Fewer than 20 occupations have no more than two-thirds of one type.
 Variable of main interest: Four categories of workplace skill level.  W i,j,t = log wage of worker i employed at plant j in year t.  X j,t = share of exports at plant j in year t.  = 1 if worker i has skill level Z, else 0.
• Z = 1 for low-skilled (omitted category), 2 for medium-skilled, 3
for high-skilled, and 4 for college or university degree.
 β L , β M , β H , and β U are four skill-specific export wage premia.  α M , α H and α U are three skill coefficients not associated with exporting.  I i,t = characteristics of worker i in year t other than skill.  P j,t = characteristics of the plant j, where i works.  Year fixed effects in all specifications.  Other fixed effects: plant, plant-occupation and plant-individual (main specification) or "spell"-fixed effect.  Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) show that a failure to control for individual and firm heterogeneity can lead to a substantial bias.  Andrews, Schank and Upward (2006) propose estimation method.  Caveat of estimates à la Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis:
 Covariates are assumed to be strictly exogenous (e.g., Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999), i.e., any sort of self-selection not allowed.  Frias, Kaplan and Verhoogen (2009)  Is product innovation relevant?
 Are observable productivity gains driving the results?
 Is it rather size-premium or skill-premium?
 Occupation-specific time-trends as an alternative hypothesis?
 No, our results on export wage premia across skillgroups hold.  where D i equals  1 if the individual is a women (in one set of regressions considering gender differences), or  1 if the individual is not a German citizen (in another set of regressions anlyzing differences in wages between foreigners and others).
 Plant-occupation fixed effects. Table 4 . Table 4 .
Conclusions
 Signficant export wage premium for higher-skilled workers and a significant export wage discount for lower-skilled workers, using a matched employer-employee dataset for German manufacturing establishments.  Evidence for within-group and between-group wage inequality.  Up to 30 percent of the overall skill premia associated with exporting.  These differences would tend to exacerbate effects of trade on inequality as trade expands.  But while the export activity contributes to conditional wage inequality along the dimension of skill, it reduces gender-based and nationality-based conditional wage inequality (wage discrimination). = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence * = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence. ** = significant at ≥ 99% level of confidence See Table 4 for list of other regressors.
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Is It Technology (eq. 4)?
 where T j,t is variable that runs from 1 (state-of-the-art) to 5 (obsolete), reporting the the establishment's self-assessment of its technology as compared to its industry competitors.
 In brief, technology apparently does not explain the observed export wage premia.  W i,j,t = log wage of worker i employed at plant j in year t.  X j,t = share of exports at plant j in year t.  = 1 if worker i has skill level Z, else 0.
• Z = 1 for low skill, 2 for medium skill, 3 for high skill, and 4 for college or university degree.
• Omitted dummy is z = 1, the low-skill dummy.
 I i,t = characteristics of worker i in year t other than skill.  P j,t = characteristics of the plant j, where i works.  Fixed effects year in all specifications.  Other fixed effects: plant, plant-occupation and plant-individual. = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence * = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence. ** = significant at ≥ 99% level of confidence Fixed Effects year in all specifications. Other fixed effects include plant (P), plant-occupation (P×O), and plant-individual (P×I). = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence * = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence. ** = significant at ≥ 99% level of confidence Fixed Effects year in all specifications. Other fixed effects include plant (P), plant-occupation (P×O), and plant-individual (P×I).
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